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The Judicial Treatment of
Noneconomic Compensatory
Damages in the 19th Century
Ronaldj Allen and Alexia Brunet*
Do high verdicts for tort cases containing noneconomic damages have
historical precedent? We present the results of our empirical inquiry into
the treatment of noneconomic compensatory damages by the courts from
1800-1900. Using 1,175 tort cases from this era, we show that, notwithstand-
ing constant reiteration ofjury discretion over damages, courts tightly con-
trolled awards. In fact, no case prior to 1900 permitted a noneconomic
compensatory damages award exceeding $450,000 in current dollars. Logis-
tic regression results reveal that an increase in total monetary damages is
positively and significantly related to the probability of reversal when non-
economic damages were claimed, and that comparability review decreases
the probability of reversal.
I. INTRODUCTION
In State Farm v. Campbell,' the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Due
Process Clause imposes limits on punitive damages. It is obvious what
*Address correspondence to Alexia Brunet, Northwestern University School of Law, 357 E.
Chicago Ave., Chicago, IL 60611; email: a-brunet@law.northwestern.edu. Allen is John Henry
Wigmore Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law; Fellow, Procedural Law
Research Center, China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing. Brunet is a Visiting
Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
We would like to acknowledge the Searle Fund for support of this project, and the comments
of Richard Posner,Jeff Rachlinski, and an anonymous reviewer. Some of the research presented
herein was performed as part of a senior research project conducted by the co-author listed
above, under the guidance of Professor Ronald J. Allen at Northwestern. We are deeply
indebted to Susan Spies Roth, a 2006 graduate of Northwestern University School of Law, for
her assistance in the preparation of this article.
1State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (holding that a punitive
damages award of $145 million, where full compensatory damages are $1 million, is excessive
and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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led the Supreme Court to rein in punitive damages. They are imposed
by a random group of citizens (jurors or judges), frequently on foreign
entities (such as out of state corporations), in the absence of any objective
measure.2 It is as though the law of State A authorized a small group of its
citizens (judge or jury) to take the property of the citizens of other states
(e.g., the shareholders in corporations) and to transfer that property to
one of their own, where the primary check on their behavior was their
own internal sense of propriety.3 Most juries and judges demonstrated
constrained good sense in their damages verdicts; however, a number
of cases returned damage awards, and punitive damages awards in
particular, that were exorbitant.4 Many of these were reduced by courts
through excessiveness review and other means, but a number were
not.5
State Farm v. Campbell provided concrete guidance on the reasonable
ranges for punitive damages awards through the now famous requirement
that, typically, punitive damages cannot exceed a single-digit multiplier of
'See, e.g., David Baldus, John C. MacQueen & George Woodworth, Improving Judicial Over-
sight ofJury Damage Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review
of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 1109, 1115 (1995).
'For a considerable period, this was the only required check so far as federal law was concerned.
Many states patrolled punitive damages for excessiveness, but punitive damage assessment was
viewed until recently as a matter of legislative or common-law grace of the various states rather
than mandated by any constitutional principles.
4See W. Kip Viscusi, The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 53 Emory L.J. 1405 (2004)
(providing an analysis of 64 punitive damages awards of at least $100 million, most of which have
been appealed, but few have been reversed). See also Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive
Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform, 33 J. Legal Stud. 1 (2004) (using the same block-
buster cases, the authors find that juries are more likely to award punitive damages than are
judges; juries award higher levels of punitive damages; and juries are largely responsible for
extremely large punitive damage amounts; juries also tend to award higher compensatory
damages, which in turn will often boost the punitive damages award). For a thoughtful critique
of the methods used in the Hesrch-Viscusi article, see Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells,
The Significant Association Between Punitive and Compensatory Damages in Blockbuster
Cases: A Methodological Primer, 3J. Empirical Legal Stud. (2006).
5See W. Kip Viscusi, The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 53 Emory L.J. 1405 (2004)
(noting that most of the awards studied-punitive damages awards of $100 million since 2004,
or 64 awards-were appealed, but that the reversal of these punitive damages awards is the
exception rather than the role; Figure 1 illustrates that 39 of the 64 cases were affirmed; id. at
1452).
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the compensatory damage award.6 Although one complaint against this
holding is its ambiguity, in time, the lower courts will create a common law
of punitive damages that will reduce the ambiguity.' The concern we
address in this and a companion article is somewhat different.' The Court
treated the universe of damages as though it were divided into compensa-
tory damages, which largely posed no problem, and punitive damages,
which did pose a problem.9 This is false. There are three types of damages:
economic compensatory damages, noneconomic compensatory damages,
and punitive damages. Economic damages, such as expectational losses
under a contract, are calculable by relatively objective measures.1" In con-
trast, punitive damages are not calculable by objective means, but neither
are noneconomic compensatory damages. Noneconomic compensatory
damages, such as pain and suffering, disfiguration, loss of consortium, or
loss of enjoyment of life, are damages for which there is no good economic
indicator.
Noneconomic compensatory damages are thus very similar to punitive
damages in the risks that they pose for rational decision making. Moreover,
now that State Farm v. Campbell has, for most the most part, precluded verdicts
in punitive damages that exceed a single-digit multiplier of the compensa-
tory damages award, one would predict that litigants would respond by
searching for ways to generate the same high returns in some other way. A
logical path, and one that is already beginning to be trod, is the pursuit of
6"[F]ew awards [of punitive damages] exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process." State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 605 (2003).
7See Mathias & Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003) (Judge
Posner permits a ratio of punitive to compensatory damages of 37.2 to 1 because of the
peculiarities of the case. He notes "the defendant's behavior was outrageous but the compens-
able harm done was slight and at the same time difficult to quantify because a large element of
it was emotional.").
'See RonaldJ. Allen, Alexia Brunet & Susan S. Roth, An External Perspective on the Nature of
Non-Economic Compensatory Damages and Their Regulation, 56 DePaul L. Rev. (forthcoming
2007).
'See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 605 (2003).
"°See Robert L. Rabin, Pain and Suffering and Beyond: Some Thoughts on Recovery for
Intangible Loss, 55 DePaul L. Rev. 359 (2006) (suggesting that intangible loss generally is more
difficult to calculate than is commonly believed).
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noneconomic compensatory damages." Some recent cases have returned
large noneconomic compensatory damage verdicts.ia Thus, State Farm v.
Campbell may turn out to be less a constraint on exorbitant damages than a
facilitation of the substitution of exorbitant noneconomic compensatory
damage awards for exorbitant punitive damage awards, a development that
obviously poses a substantial policy question.
We do not address the policy question here, however. Rather, our
interest lies in the nature of noneconomic compensatory damages and the
manner in which the courts historically have treated them. The courts have
consistently asserted that all forms of compensatory damages entail facts,"3
yet they have also consistently asserted that juries have large discretion in
finding noneconomic compensatory damages. 4 These two propositions are
the subjects of our two articles. In the companion article, we examine the
analytical nature of noneconomic compensatory damages and their consti-
tutional status. 5 One critical question for such analyses, and thus the
"See Catherine Sharkey, Crossing the Punitive-Compensatory Divide, Northwestern University
Law and Economics Colloquium Working Paper (2005). Sharkey presents a preliminary empiri-
cal test of the cross-over hypothesis, showing that limits on punitive damages will lead to
increases in compensatory damages as jurors substitute noneconomic damages for punitive
damages. Using a sample of cases from the largest counties across the United States for three
time periods, she finds that the presence of a punitive cap has a positive statistically significant
impact on the award of compensatory damages across all case types.
12Lexis Jury and Verdict Reports, Westlaw Jury and Verdict Reports, and the National Law Journal
provide the following four examples from 2001-2004 (awards in parentheses): Velarde v. Illinois
Cent. R.R. Co., 354 Ill. App. 3d 523 (2004) ($49 million), Ford v. Sasser, 274 Ga. App. 459 (2005)
($33 million), Burch v. Children's Hosp. of Orange County Thrift Stores Inc., 109 Cal. App. 4th
537 (2001) ($25 million), Bondi v. Bambrick, 308 A.D.2d 330 (2003) ($9.75 million).
131n Cooperlndus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001), the Court held
that "[a] jury's assessment of the extent of a plaintiffs injury is essentially a factual determina-
tion, whereas its imposition of punitive damages is an expression of its moral condemnation."
Thus, compensatory damages are factual determinations for the jury. If this is indeed not the
case, and damages are not facts, then their assessment violates the rule of law in the same
fashion as punitive damage assessment, and noneconomic damages should be treated accord-
ingly. In this article, we operate under the assumption that noneconomic compensatory
damages are indeed facts and make our arguments from this basic premise.
"See note 17.
'5See RonaldJ. Allen, Alexia Brunet & Susan S. Roth, An External Perspective on the Nature of
Non-Economic Compensatory Damages and Their Regulation, 56 DePaul L. Rev. (forthcoming
2007).
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appropriate starting point and the focus of this article, is the historical
treatment of the matter in question.16
In this article, we present the results of our empirical inquiry into the
treatment of noneconomic compensatory damages by the courts from 1800
to 1900. This period includes the founding era, the post-Civil War Recon-
struction era, and the ensuing constitutional amendments. We find that,
notwithstanding reiteration of the discretion that juries have over damages,
the courts tightly controlled their awards of noneconomic compensatory
damages. High awards were uniformly reversed, resulting in actual awards
clustering fairly closely over means and medians, and there is a strong
relationship between the size of the award for cases awarding noneco-
nomic compensatory damages and the probability of reversal. Indeed, as
we elaborate below, the most startling finding is that there are literally
no cases affirmed on appeal prior to 1900 that plausibly involved
noneconomic compensatory damages in which the total damages
(noneconomic and economic combined) exceeded $450,000 in current
dollars."
II. THE TREATMENT OF NONECONOMIC
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FROM 1800 TO 1900
The "great discretion" that juries have in determining damages is com-
mented on repeatedly in the case law.'" Nonetheless, our hypothesis was that
'The Supreme Court has held that, in order to find a particular interest protected under the
Due Process Clause, that interest must be one that is deeply rooted in history and tradition. See
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-23 (1989) ("In an attempt to limit and guide
interpretation of the Clause, we have insisted not merely that the interest denominated as a
'liberty' be 'fundamental' (a concept that, in isolation, is hard to objectify), but also that it be
an interest traditionally protected by our society. As we have put it, the Due Process Clause
affords only those protections 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.'") (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (Cardozo,
J.)). Our cases reflect "continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history [and] solid
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.. . ." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 501 (1965) (Harlan,J., concurring in judgment).
"7See, e.g., Bergmann v.Jones, 94 N.Y. 51 (1883) (affirming ajudgment for $450,000 in current
dollars).
"See, e.g., the excellent review of the cases expressing such an opinion in Brad Snyder,
Protecting the Media from Excessive Damages: The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Remittitur
370 Allen and Brunet
the reality of the courts' treatment of such damages would be quite at odds
with their public statements about them. We formed this hypothesis largely
on the basis of work done by Professor Allen on the numerous ways courts
exercised control over the fact-finding process, even in the teeth of con-
certed political opposition designed to restrict that control. 9 From this
general perspective on the nature of juridical proof, we thought it implau-
sible that the courts would relinquish damages determinations, which com-
prise one of the most highly significant aspects of the fact-finding process.
We decided to investigate the matter from a historical perspective by collect-
ing historical case data. The following sections first describe the methodol-
ogy for collecting the historical case data, and then use descriptive statistics
to summarize the data, followed by the employment of inferential statistics to
draw inferences from the data.
To foreshadow what comes, we identified a set of 1,175 cases from the
period between 1800 and 1900 that involved compensatory damages. We
found that: (1) cases that are reversed have higher (mean, median) total
damages than cases that are affirmed; (2) cases that are reversed and claim to
contain noneconomic damages have higher (mean, median) total damages
than cases that are affirmed; (3) appellate courts are more likely to affirm if
comparability review is employed; (4) cases that are reversed and contained
a remittitur had higher (mean, median) total damages than cases that are
affirmed and contained a remittitur. We use inferential statistics to show that
results (1) and (2) were found to be statistically significant at the 1 percent
level.
We then used logistic regression to determine which factors increase
the probability of case reversal during the 19th century. A key finding in this
model is that the size of the total damage award is positively related to the
probability of reversal. Moreover, when the cases are divided into cases that
contain economic damages, cases that contain noneconomic damages, and
cases in which one cannot distinguish whether one or both types of damages
were present, the effect of total damages in predicting rate of reversal is
dramatically positive and statistically significant in cases with noneconomic
and its Modem Application in Food Lion, 24 Vt. L. Rev. 299 (2000). See also Theodore
Sedgewick, On the Measure of Damages 20 (6th ed. 1874) ("The quantum of damages, being in
most cases entirely blended with the questions of fact, must have been from the outset left with
the jury.").
"5 See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions in Civil Actions Reconsidered, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 843
(1981).
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damages. Finally, the practice of comparability review decreases the prob-
ability of reversal, especially in cases that contain noneconomic damages,
and the practice of remittitur decreases the probability of reversal in cases
where economic damages are present.
The most striking implications of our empirical study support our
original hypothesis that the courts indeed kept a tight control over jury
damage awards, notwithstanding the oft-stated proposition of significantjury
discretion.
A. Methodology for Collecting Historical Case Data
A data set of state and federal tort cases was collected to examine the size
of damage judgments generally, and noneconomic compensatory damages
specifically, in the 19th century. The cases were read, entered into a data-
base, and submitted to different tests of robustness for consistency and
completeness. This resulted in a final data set of 1,175 cases for which a
compensatory damage verdict was revealed in an opinion.
1. Steps in Compiling the Historical Case Data
We used electronic databases to compile our data set of historical cases.2"
Using LexisNexis©, a search for the term "compensatory damages" in cases
from 1800-1900 resulted in 844 cases.21 This is labeled "Search 1" (Table 1,
2 There is obviously a difference between all cases and all cases that result in published opinions,
and thus we hesitate to make sweeping claims about all tort litigation based solely on published
opinions. However, as we discuss in Section II.C.1, almost surely this difference results in the
damage verdicts we report being inflated, thus adding a conservative bias to our results. In other
words, overall damages awards in the 19th century probably were considerably more restrained
than we report.
21Search 1 on Lexis is: Legal > Area of Law-By Topic > Torts > Cases > Tort > Federal & State
Cases-Selected Tort Material, using Search terms: compensatory damages and date(geq
(01/01/1800) and leq (01/01/1900)). This search produced 894 state and federal tort cases.
As our interest is in compensatory damages, 50 cases were eliminated from the data set that
were not actions in tort and that, in addition, plainly had no connection to the question we
were investigating. We ran the same search on the 18th century and got zero results. For
completeness, we performed this test on a date range including the 18th century using the
term "damages." Of the 70 opinions found, three could be considered in the data set;
however, only two contain monetary damages and those are purely economic damages cases.
We do not consider cases where monetary damages are not provided in the opinion, and
since our focus is on noneconomic damages we do not consider the noneconomic damages
case.
372 Allen and Brunet
Table 1: State and Federal Tort Cases, 1800-1900
A B C
Cases with No Damage Cases with a Damage
Amount Recorded in the Amount Recorded in the
Total Number of Cases Opinion Opinion
Original search, 844 266 578
Search I
Additional search, 1,231 634 597
Search 2
Total 2,075 900 1,175
Column A). Of the 844 cases, only 578 contained a monetary damage verdict
referred to in the opinion (Table 1, Column C).
To ensure completeness, we conducted two additional searches. First,
we searched using the core term "damages" and an additional core term for
one of six primary causes of action in our data set.22 We then searched using
the core term "damages" and one of five prevalent types of noneconomic
compensatory damages at the time (mental distress, pain and suffering,
anguish, loss of reputation, loss of society).23 We matched the results from
these two additional searches against the original set of 844 cases and found
22Search 2, Part 1 was compiled on Lexis using the following terms: Legal > Area of Law-By
Topic > Torts > Cases > Tort > Federal & State Cases - Selected Tort Material. This search
specified the date range (1800-1900), the court (state and federal), and the type of case (tort
cases), and, using the Lexis "core term" feature, we searched using the core term "damages" and
an additional core term for one of the six identified leading causes of action in our data set
(negligence, trespass, assault, slander, libel, ejection). According to Lexis, words selected as
"core terms" are those that provide the best match between words important to the document
and words important in the field of law. This resulted in the following cases: negligence (419),
trespass (591), slander (249), libel (244), ejection (19), assault (200), assault and battery (122).
For example, for negligence cases, we conducted this search: Search terms: core-terms (negli-
gence) and core-terms (damages) and date(geq (01/01/1800) and leq (01/01/1900)). For
completeness, we searched cases in the 18th century using the core terms feature and the cause
of action and found one case for purely economic damages.
23Search 2, Part 2 was compiled on Lexis using the following terms: the core term "damages" and
one of five different types of noneconomic compensatory damages (mental distress, pain and
suffering, anguish, loss of reputation, loss of society), resulting in 67 cases. Running the same
search on the 18th century resulted in zero cases because the "core term" feature was rarely used
at the time. Even after modifying the search term from "damages" as a regular term versus a core
term and combining it with each of the five different types of compensatory damages, we found
18 cases, none of which met the database criteria.
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597 cases that contained a monetary damage verdict referred to in the
opinion (Table 1, Column C). Combining the results of Searches I and 2
generated the set of 1,175 cases that involved compensatory damages.
We read all 1,175 cases and collected 24 case elements for each case for
inclusion in the database: (1) the case name; (2) the case citation; (3) the
date decided; (4) the appellate court name; (5) the lower court name; (6)
the cause of action; (7) the case facts; (8) the lower court trier (judge/jury/
can't tell); (9) whether the plaintiff won in the lower court (yes/no); (10)
whether the opinion provided jury instructions on punitive damages (yes/
no); (11) whether the opinion provided jury instructions on compensatory
damages (yes/no); (12) whether the lower court entered a remittitur (yes/
no); (13) the lower court actual damage verdict amount; (14) the final lower
court actual verdict amount as reduced by a remittitur (if any); (15) the
compensatory verdict actual damage amount (if separated from the lower
court damage verdict); (16) the punitive verdict actual damage amount (if
separated from the lower court damage verdict); (17) whether the case
contained noneconomic damages (yes/no/can't tell);24 (18) the appellate
court holding; (19) the actual remittitur amount; (20) general notes; (21)
award notes; (22) whether comparability review was present (yes/no); (23)
whether the case was reversed due to the remittitur (yes/no); and (24) the
reason for reversal.
Finally, as another check to verify that we had collected all the relevant
cases on point, we reviewed two historical articles on comparability review25
2 40ur interest lies in 19th-century treatment of noneconomic damages, but it is often difficult to
determine from the cases whether compensatory damages are granted for economic losses such
as lost wages, or for noneconomic compensatory reasons such as mental suffering. See Neil
Vidmar, Pap and Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us about Jury Behavior
and the Tort System, 28 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 1205 (1994) (drawing attention to the unwarranted
assumption that there is a "bright line" separating economic from noneconomic damage).
25See, e.g., Paul DeCamp, Beyond State Farm: Due Process Constraints on NonEconomic Com-
pensatory Damages, 27 Harv.J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 231 (2003). DeCamp cites five historical tort cases
that would be in our data set but for the fact that they did not contain the search terms we used,
or were not listed in electronic databases. Wilfrd v. Berkley, I Burr. 609, 97 Eng. Rep. 472, KB.
(1758) and Goldsmith v. Lord Sefton, 3 Anst. 808, 145 Eng. Rep. 1046, Ex. (1796), are not in our
data set because they are not found in Westlaw or Lexis; Clapp v. Hudson River R.R. Co., 19 Barb.
461, N.Y. Sup. Ct. (1854) and Murray v. Hudson River R.R. Co., 47 Barb. 196, N.Y. Sup. Ct. (1866),
affd, 48 N.Y. 655 (1871), are not in Lexis but are in Westlaw. Clapp v. Hudson River R.R. Co.
contains monetary damages and could have contained noneconomic damages but it does not
contain any of the primary search terms we used to build our data set. Murray v. Hudson River
R.R. Co. uses the term "damages" rather than the term "compensatory damages" in the opinion.
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and remittitur, 6 reading all the cases that these pieces cited. We identified
nine cases cited in these articles that were not in our database that could
have contained noneconomic damages. We analyzed the mean and median
award for those nine cases and compared it with the mean and median for
the 1,175 cases we collected. The mean in our cases exceeded the mean for
the nine cases we did not collect, while the reverse is true for medians.27 We
should note that there were no high damages cases. We can conclude that
the nine cases are well within the parameters of our larger subset.
B. Transposing Actual Awards into Awards in Current Dollars
Given the varying value of the currency and inflation during the time period
under observation, making any comparisons among jury verdicts of the 19th
century requires converting nominal verdicts to awards in current dollars. The
economics literature suggests that there is no correct measure, and economic
historians use one or more different series depending on the context of the
question proposed. The two measures most frequently used in the literature
are the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the Gross Domestic Product Defla-
tor (GDP Deflator). The CPI compares the cost of products and services that
the average household buys; the GDP Deflator compares "bundles" of all
goods and services produced in the economy, not just consumer goods and
services that are reflected in the CPI. We selected the CPI as the deflator for
the verdict amounts because it is the most popular method for making such
comparisons.28 The CPI estimates are also higher than the GDP Deflator
Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas 760, C.C. D. Mass. (1822), no. 1578, is not included because it does not
contain the search terms used nor does it contain a monetary damage amount in the opinion.
2 6See, e.g., Brad Snyder, The Nineteenth Century Origins of Remittitur and Its Modem Appli-
cation in Food Lion, 24 Vt. L. Rev. 299 (2000). Snyder cites 20 historical cases, of which four could
have been included in the data set for several reasons. Howard v. Grover, 28 Me. 97 (1848),
contains a damage amount that could have included noneconomic damages; however, while the
case cites the terms "sufferings," "expense," and "loss of time," it does not include the primary
search terms. Two libel cases, Coleman v. Southwick, 9Johns, 45 (1812), and Root v. King, 7 Cow.
613 (1827), are not included in our data set because they do not contain any of the relevant
search terms. Another case of libel, Southwick v. Stevens, 10Johns. 444 (1813), includes the term
"damages" but does not contain any terms for the leading noneconomic damages.
27Contrast the mean and median for the nine cases found in DeCamp and Snyder, $50,896 and
$31,220, with the mean and median found in our data set of 1,175 cases, $59,052 and $21,600.
28'he GDP was not measured before the 1930s, and thus any measure pre-1930 may not be as
reliable because it relies on sources that were not collected for the purpose of constructing
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estimates,29 and CPI estimates tend to overstate the cost of medical care. Thus
our transposition of 19th-century awards would tend to result in overcompen-
sation, adding a conservative bias to our results."
C. Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests for the 1,175 Cases
The database of 1,175 cases spans the period of 1800-1900. The first and last
tort cases mentioning compensatory damages in the printed opinions were
decided in 1808 and 1900, respectively." We begin by introducing an over-
view of the cases and then shift the focus to a summary of the trial court
damage amounts.
1. Overview of the Cases
As Figure 1 illustrates, the majority of the cases were tried in the latter half of
the 19th century, with 57 cases tried from 1800-1850 and 1,118 cases tried
from 1851-1900. The rate of reversal was relatively steady throughout the
century. Trial court awards were reversed at the appellate level at a rate of 47
percent, and affirmed at a rate of 53 percent. 2
national income and product accounts. The CPI, however, provides a reasonable approxima-
tion of the modern-day worth of a sum of money from the 19th century. For earlier years, the
CPI is the most useful series for comparing the cost of consumer goods and services. Although
CPI estimates are readily available for the time period post-1913 from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, estimates of earlier time periods are based on the efforts of economists and economic
historians who have recreated CPI estimates and then linked them to the modern series. We use
Williamson estimates. See, e.g., Samuel H. Williamson, What is the Relative Value? Economic
History Services, Apr. 15, 2004, available at http://www.eh/net/hmit/compare/.
'The CPI merely describes the central tendency in the movement of prices in an economy.
Because the CPI uses average prices for a comparison, a verdict in 1850 may not be exactly as
predicted.
"The cost of medical services does not increase at the rate as all goods and services. The Bureau
of Labor Statistics has tracked medical care costs of all goods and services (for U.S. Cities, All
Urban Consumers, Not Seasonally Adjusted). Looking at the all-goods CPI from 1957-2006 and
comparing it with the medical-goods CPI shows that during this period the cost of all goods and
services has increased at a significantly higher rate than the cost of medical goods.
See notes 20-22 for a discussion of the searches performed using 18th-century cases.
"The time blocks in Figure 1 represent the % cases affirmed/% cases reversed. The numerical
breakdown for Figure 1 is: 1800-1820 = 63/38; 1821-30 = 50/50; 1831-40 = 64/36; 1841-
50 =45/55; 1851-60 =45/55; 1861-70=38/62; 1871-80=49/51; 1881-90=53/47; 1891-
1900 = 61/39.
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As Table 2 shows, the seven prominent causes of action were negligence,
trespass, assault, slander, libel, wrongful ejection,"
3 and personal injury.14
One striking feature of the data set is that the 1,175 cases overwhelm-
ingly represent lower court verdicts for the plaintiff. The 1,175 cases
are mostly appellate cases, 5 tried by juries at the trial court level (95 per-
"In wrongful ejection actions, typically the plaintiff was wrongfully ejected from a train some
distance from the terminal in a highly dangerous situation.
34Note that while the cause of action was easily discernible from the case opinion itself and
frequently recorded in the case disposition, trespass actions were difficult to classify. For example,
trespass actions included "action [s] in trespass on the case to recover for defective goods." See,
e.g., Charles D. Durfee & Peter C. Bird v. Daniel B. Newkirk &Jay Hicks, 83 Mich. 522 (1890)
("action [s] in trespass for false imprisonment"). See, e.g.,Jonathan P. Palmer v. Maine Cent. R.R.
Co., 92 Me. 399 (1899); ("action[s] in trespass for physical injury"). See, e.g., Ruth A. Collins v.
East Tenn., Va. & Geo. R.R. Co., 56 Tenn. 841 (1872) (action[s] in trespass for assault and
battery"). See, e.g., Charles G. Macintosh v. Jeremiah Bartlett, 67 Me. 130 (1877).
3 'To validate this result, similar searches were performed using another leading legal database,
WESTLAW. These searches demonstrated that an overwhelming number of the cases are
appellate cases.
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Table 2: Leading Causes of Action (N= 1,175)
Cause of Action Number of Cases Percentage of Total
Wrongful death 30 3
Personal injury 41 3








cent),36 with nearly all (98 percent) of the cases originating from trial court
verdicts for the plaintiff.37 Most cases were appealed to state appellate courts
(98 percent), with over half the cases in the data set decided in the states of
Illinois, Missouri, New York, Wisconsin, Texas, and Kentucky.
The seemingly high percentage of lower court verdicts for the plain-
tiff begs examination. We recognized that our original set of 1,175 cases
would be biased in favor of plaintiffs' victories as our data-collection
methods excluded cases in which there was no damage figure printed in
the opinion; this would tend to occur in any case where the defendant won
at trial. For this reason, we examined the 900 cases with no recorded
damage figure in the opinion that were omitted from the empirical results
of this study, drawing on a random sample from these cases to determine
the plaintiff win rate. The result suggests that approximately 504 of the 900
cases without a damage amount in the opinion, or 56 percent, were
lower court verdicts for the plaintiff. Using the number of plaintiff wins
(1,655) and the total number of cases collected (2,075), we can infer that
"The remaining 5 percent of cases were either tried byjudges (2.5 percent) or could not be
classified (2.5 percent).
1
7 ln this study, "plaintiff win" is a positive amount awarded to the plaintiff. Not every plaintiff
who receives a positive damage award will believe that the outcome of the jury trial has been
successful. The damages awarded may sometimes be less than the attorneys or the plaintiffs
aimed for, less than what they anticipated, and sometimes much less than the costs they incurred
during litigation and trial. Thus "wins" in this study are being strictly defined and may at times
result in unsatisfied and unhappy plaintiffs and very pleased defendants.
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approximately 80 percent of the total original cases were lower court ver-
dicts for the plaintiff."8
The bias in our sample toward cases with damage awards raises one last
methodological point we should mention. As we elaborate below, we found
from our sample that damages awards in the 19th century were quite
restrained, yet even these results are almost surely biased upward. Adding a
number of cases with zero damages would obviously lower the means and
medians of damage awards that we report and further compress the standard
deviations. Even if one looks only at damages in those cases in which
damages were awarded (which we think is the more pertinent question), it is
hard to imagine a plausible set of circumstances in which high damages
awards routinely would not be appealed, and it is easy to imagine a set of
circumstances in which low damages awards routinely would not be
appealed. High damages awards tend to be entered against institutional
parties, such as corporations (railroads being the dominant example so far as
we can tell). These parties have the resources and incentives to appeal
adverse results, and did so quite successfully (thus strengthening their incen-
tives). Low damages awards, by contrast, are equivalent to defense victories
in many instances, and the cost of an appeal may easily exceed the damages.
Thus, a sampling of all cases from the 19th century, rather than the reported
cases that we rely on, is highly likely to generate even more constrained
damages than we report. We should also mention that none of the various
ways that we searched for cases turned up a high damages case that was not
within our sample, thus giving us considerable confidence that, even if there
are some such cases, there are relatively few of them.
"We do not attempt to explain why, in our data set, lower court verdicts were pro-plaintiff,
although it may have something to do with contingency fees. The use of contingency fees
became commonplace by 1870 and pervasive by 1890. See Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to
Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of the Contingency Fee Contracts, a History to 1940,
47 DePaul L. Rev. 231, 234 (1997) (noting that most states adhered to the traditional English
rule barring contingency fee contracts by penal statues and the common-law doctrine of
champerty; however, the contingency fee contract was used in antebellum America and by 1850
it had become an established feature of the American legal scene). See also Lawrence M.
Friedman, A History of American Law 482 (2d ed. 1985) (noting that contingency fees were
practically universal by 1881). See Peter Karsten, Heart Versus Head: Judge-Made Law in
Nineteenth Century America 198 (1997) (noting that, among other things, the use of contin-
gency fees was perceived as necessary from a humane perspective, and allowed plaintiffs that
would otherwise not have their day in court an opportunity to plead their case; for example, a
socioeconomic view of 19th-century tort plaintiffs reveals that many plaintiffs could have
benefited from low-cost representation).
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2. Trends in Trial Court Awards
The following sections provide insights into the relationships between total
damages and the rate of reversal, remittitur and rate of reversal, compar-
ability review and rate of reversal, and noneconomic damages and the rate of
reversal. Descriptive and univariate statistics are used to present the results.
A more formal treatment of these items is found in Section II.D.
a. TotalDamages and Rate of Reversal. As caseloads increased over time, so did
monetary verdicts, even after adjusting for inflation. Figure 2 illustrates the
range of damage awards in our data set in current (2003) dollars, distin-
guishing between reversals (triangles) and affirmances (circles). Looking
from left to right demonstrates that damage verdicts at the beginning of the
century were low and gradually increased. Lower court awards ranged from
$12 to $1,080,000, with a mean award of $59,052. Pre-1850 cases had a mean
award of $21,278, and a median award of $11,390, while post-1850 cases had
a mean award of $60,978, and a median award of $22,000.
Beyond the upward trend in monetary awards, our data reveal that high
damage awards rarely survived appellate review. The awards for reversed
cases are larger and increasing at a higher rate than either awards for
affirmed cases or awards for total cases. Table 3 displays summary statistics
for all affirmed cases, all reversed cases, and all affirmed and reversed cases
combined. For affirmed cases, final jury damage awards ranged from $18 to
$926,250, with a mean damage award of $50,618 and a median award of
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Table 3: Distribution of 1,175 Trial Court Awards, 1800-1900
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$21,000. In contrast, damage amounts for reversed cases are higher, ranging
from $12 to $1,080,000, with a mean damage award of $68,607 and a median
award of $21,800. Figure 3 suggests that for a majority of the century, cases
that were reversed had consistently higher mean and median award amounts
when compared to affirmed cases.
To formalize this inquiry using univariate statistics, we would like to test
for differences in the mean damages for affirmed and reversed cases.
However, because there is a trend in damage awards across the century and
because the distribution of reversed and affirmed cases may not be equal over
time, it could be that a test for mean differences isjust picking up differences
in when the cases occurred. Thus, before the formal tests, we need to de-trend
the data by regressing the inflation-adjusted damages on a time-trend variable.
The residuals from such a regression are the de-trended damages.
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A t test for mean differences for affirmed and reversed cases can be
calculated using the de-trended damages. The p value of such a test finds a
significant difference in damages for affirmed and reversed cases at the 1
percent significance level. Damages are statistically higher for cases that are re-
versed. However, this test suffers from the fact that the data are skewed and not
normally distributed (notice the large difference between the means and the
medians in Table 3). Extreme damage awards may be driving the difference in
means. Thus, we apply a second test, the Mann-Whitney test, which can be
used to test nonparametrically for differences in central values of the damages
by affirmed and reversed cases. The nonparametric test also rejects equiva-
lence of affirmed and reversal damages at the 1 percent level of significance.
Both Table 3 and Figure 3 suggest that a high award is likely to be from
a reversed case." Can we state at this point that an increase in the total damage
award will increase the rate of case reversal? As mentioned earlier, of the 1,175
cases, 554 cases (47 percent) were reversed on appeal. Of these, 289 cases (58
percent) were reversed with "excessive damages" listed as one of the grounds
for reversal.4 Examining the high damages cases may provide insight into this
question. For the 80 cases with verdicts over $200,000, 53 cases (66 percent)
were reversed, with 34 (43 percent) of these including excessiveness as a
3 These data demonstrate that another conventional belief about how the 19th-century courts
handled damages is false. Dissenting in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415
(1996),Justice Stevens uttered the conventional view that "[c]ommon-law courts were hesitant
to disturb jury awards, but less so in cases in which 'a reasonably certain measure of damages is
afforded.' I D. Graham, Law of New Trials in Cases Civil and Criminal 452 (2d ed. 1855);
Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law, 47 L.Q. Rev. 345, 363-364 (1931)." 518 U.S.
at 446. Both points are false. As one can tell from the data, throughout the 19th century, courts
reversed jury verdicts at a very steady rate of about 47 percent, which hardly constitutes a
hesitancy to reverse. Second, in cases involving noneconomic compensatory damages, the
reversal rate was approximately 50 percent, and in cases involving economic damages with no
noneconomic damages, the reversal rate was about 51 percent, which again hardly constitutes
much of a greater reluctance to reverse noneconomic damages cases. In cases in which one
cannot tell from the opinion whether noneconomic damages were awarded, the reversal rate
was about 44 percent, but these cases simply do not focus on the damages question and thus do
not pertain to the question at hand (and in any event the rate of reversal in this set is reasonably
close to the other two). In addition, as the amount of noneconomic compensatory damages
goes up, the probability of reversal goes up to essentially 1.0. By contrast, there is no relationship
between the amount of economic damages and the rate of reversal. See Section D, Logistic
Regression Model: Factors Determining the Rate of Reversal, infra.
'For a discussion of contemporary reasons for reversing lower court decisions, see Brian
Ostrom, Roger Hanson & Henry Daley, So the Verdict Is In-What Happens Next? The
Continuing Story of Tort Awards in the State Courts, 16Justice System J. 103 (1993).
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ground for reversal. Narrowing the focus to cases with more than $400,000 in
damages, for these 23 cases, 17 cases (74 percent) were reversed, with 11 cases
(48 percent) of these including excessiveness as grounds for reversal. There
appears to be a difference between the reversal rates for cases over $200,000
and for cases over $400,000; however, this is not sufficient evidence to claim
that the rate of reversal increases with an increase in damages awards. We leave
the issue for later examination using multivariate methods.
b. Remittitur and Rate of Reversal. Verdicts, we found, were often not the
determination of the jury alone. One way that 19th-century judges influ-
enced the final outcomes in tort cases was by amending the jury verdict with
a remittitur. When a losing defendant was dissatisfied over the amount
awarded to a winning plaintiff, the defendant could seek an adjustment in
hopes of minimizing the monetary loss. The judge, at his discretion, would
ask for the winning plaintiff to "remit" a certain sum and, in turn, the judge
would grant an affirmance instead of granting a motion for a new trial. The
practice of remittitur was present in our cases. In the data set, a "lower court
award" was offset by a remittitur, if any, resulting in the "final award."'" The
monetary remittitur amounts were recorded in the data set.
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for all cases. The first observation
in Table 4 is that 10 percent of the cases in our database of 1,175 cases
contain cases with remittiturs.42 Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the
113 cases in which remittiturs were found. The minimum and maximum
remittitur amounts were $57 and $420,000, respectively. Remittiturs were
more common in affirmed cases compared to reversed cases. For the cases
with remittiturs, the mean award varied, depending on the case disposition,
with reversals reporting higher mean and median awards. The mean award
for the 67 affirmed cases where a remittitur was present was $46,503, while
the mean award for the 46 cases that were reversed and a remittitur was
present was $75,046. Among these 46 reversals, 37 were reversed due to
excessive damages notwithstanding the trial court remittitur, suggesting that
4 For a discussion of the practice of remittitur, see, e.g., Hallett Kilbourn v. John G. Thompson,
I McArth. & M. 401 (1883).
4
1
2This is thus at odds with the standard view today to the effect that remittiturs were quite rare
in torts cases. See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 16, at 308. As will become clear, our data are largely
in agreement with Snyder's basic point that the judges "limited the discretionary power ofjuries
in tort cases through a variety of procedural devices such as special verdict, directed verdict, new
trial, and eventually remittitur." Id.
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Table 4: Distribution of Final
Reversed
Damage Awards, Sorted by Affirmed and
N Mean ($) Median ($) Max ($) Min ($)
All cases total 1,175 59,052 21,600 1,080,000 12
N Mean ($) Median ($) Max ($) Min ($)
Affirmed cases 621 50,618 21,000 926,250 18
For subsets of affirmed cases
Was a remitter present? Yes 67 46,539 20,000 420,000 57
Was comparability rcview Yes 49 52,810 19,000 300,000 18
present? No 572 50,430 22,000 926,250 18
Were noneconomic Yes 225 54,050 22,000 900,000 22
damages present? No 167 42,435 13,200 420,000 18
Can't tell 229 53,215 23,750 926,250 18
N Mean ($) Median ($) Max ($) Min ($)
Reversed cases 554 68,507 21,800 1,080,000 12
For subsets of reversed cases
Was a remittitur present? Yes 46 75,046 54,500 396,044 546
Was comparability review Yes 34 131,998 22,625 1,080,000 1,210
present? No 520 64,355 21,800 1,000,000 12
Were noneconomic Yes 229 106,047 59,400 1,000,000 425
damages present? No 177 37,120 9,480 527,040 17
Can't tell 148 47,958 10,900 1,080,000 12
the remittitur served as a signal for the appellate courts to review the case
more carefully for excessiveness.43 We also found that 10 percent of cases
4 The remaining nine reversals in cases that contained a remittitur were for reasons such asjury
instructions or simply because the verdict was not supported by the evidence. A reversal
notwithstanding a remittitur is consistent with the modern findings of Shanley and Peterson
(1987) that appellate courts are most likely to modify awards that are much larger than average,
particularly in those cases where the basis for the award is not clearly defined. See Shanley &
Peterson (1987), cited in Brian Ostrom, Roger Hanson & Henry Daley, So the Verdict Is
In-What Happens Next? The Continuing Story of Tort Awards in the State Courts, 16Justice
System J. 103 (1993). We present data below indicating that remittiturs only affect rate of
reversal for cases where economic damages are present. In these cases, lower court use of
remittitur makes it less likely that the case will be reversed at the appellate level.
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with noneconomic damages contained remittiturs, which is equivalent to the
rate of remittitur in the full data set of 1,175 cases, thus suggesting that the
presence of noneconomic damages does not influence remittitur practice.
In the next section, we use multivariate analysis to examine therelationship
between the use of remittitur and the rate of reversal for all cases and for a
subset of cases where only noneconomic damages were present.
c. Comparability Review and Rate of Reversal. Table 4 presents the number of
cases where the appellate court employed the practice of "comparability
review," or comparing the verdict amount with verdicts of other jurisdic-
tions before deciding whether to reverse or affirm a lower court decision.
Of the 1,175 cases, 7 percent used comparability review. Among the cases
that contained comparability review, 59 percent were affirmed, suggesting
that comparability review is positively correlated with cases that were
affirmed. We will later use multivariate analysis to examine the relationship
between comparability review and the rate of reversal for all cases and for
a subset of cases where only noneconomic damages were present.
d. Noneconomic Damages and Rate of Reversal. Figure 3 and Tables 3 and 4
confirm that cases that are reversed report higher mean damage amounts
than cases that are affirmed. At this point, we would like to investigate
whether the added damages from the inclusion of noneconomic awards (1)
contributed to larger overall damages, and (2) caused reversals to occur with
a higher probability irrespective of total award amounts. As a starting point
for understanding this relationship, we continued with a univariate exami-
nation of the data.
We first examined the mean and median of the three damage catego-
ries coded in the data set: (1) cases where the opinion mentioned noneco-
nomic damages in a discussion of the award ("yes"), (2) cases where the
opinion did not mention noneconomic damages in a discussion of the award
("no"), and (3) cases where such a determination was inconclusive ("can't
tell"). The "can't tell" category includes cases that may have contained
noneconomic damages due to the nature of the injury, but such were not
mentioned in the opinion.
Table 4 shows that noneconomic damages are present in cases that
are reversed and cases that are affirmed in almost equal proportion.
However, cases that have noneconomic damages and are reversed report
higher mean and median damages than cases that are affirmed. Specifi-
cally, affirmed cases that contain noneconomic damages have a mean and
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median of $54,050 and $22,000, respectively, while reversed cases that
contain noneconomic damages have a mean and median of $106,047 and
$59,400, respectively. We formulated a t test to test the difference between
the mean award for affirmed and reversed cases for the 454 cases with
noneconomic damages. The result was statistically significant at the 1
percent level both in the standard mean t statistic and the nonparametric
Mann-Whitney test.44 These data indicate that courts in the 19th century
seemed to treat cases with noneconomic damages differently than cases
without noneconomic damages.
Another way to view these data is across time, rather than at a single
point in time as presented in Table 4. Figure 4 reillustrates damage awards
over time as presented in Figure 3, this time focusing on the mean and
median damage awards. Figure 4 suggests that, over the century, both the
mean and median awards for cases that contain noneconomic damages
("yes") are larger than the mean and median for cases that do not contain
noneconomic damages ("no"). The mean and median for cases for which
one cannot tell whether noneconomic damages are present ("can't tell") are
'Using the de-trended real damages data, the standard mean difference result is: two sample
t (452) = 4.53, p < 0.0001.
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Table 5: Percentiles by Award and Reversal Rate Reported for Cases With
and Without Noneconomic Damages
Reversal Rate
Cases With Noneconomic Cases Without Noneconomic
Quintile Count Award in Current Dollars Damages Damages
1 237 $12-4,500 31% 52%
2 234 $4,572-13,200 22% 59%
3 235 $13,300-35,000 48% 50%
4 237 $35,100-90,000 59% 55%
5 232 $90,072-1,080,000 70% 39%
also generally larger than the mean and median for the cases that do not
contain noneconomic damages.
Next, we examined the relationship between noneconomic damages
and case reversal. We classified the 1,175 cases into five quintiles according
to the award in current dollars, with each quintile containing approximately
232 cases. As Table 5 shows, the rate of reversal for cases that contain
noneconomic damages increases with damage amount, from 31 percent to
70 percent, while the rate of reversal for cases that did not contain noneco-
nomic damages decreases (nonmonotonically) with damage amount, from
52 percent to 39 percent. Although these results suggest that the rate of
reversal is higher for cases with noneconomic damages, we leave the issue for
examination in the next section using multivariate methods.
D. Logistic Regression Model: Factors Determining the Rate of Reversal
The previous section demonstrated that reversed cases have a higher mean
total damages award than cases that are affirmed, and that, for cases where
only noneconomic damages are present, affirmed and reversed cases are
statistically different, with reversed cases reporting higher mean damage
awards. Perhaps the most interesting question, and one that was briefly
examined in the previous section, is whether the rate of reversal is positively
related to an increase in total damages. To determine whether this is true
and, in particular, whether the rate of reversal is positively related to an
increase in total damages for cases where we know that noneconomic
damages are present, we need to use statistical techniques that go beyond
studying the relationship between two variables. We need to examine the
relationship between total damages and rate of reversal while simultaneously
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considering the effects of comparability review and remittitur. For this, we
use multivariate (logistic regression) techniques.
We specified four logistic regression (logit) models (Models 1-4), and
found strong evidence of the relationship between rate of reversal and
increase in total damages, particularly where noneconomic damages were
present. The dependent variable was coded 1 if the case was reversed, and 0
if the case was not reversed. Each model contained a measure of damages. A
plot of the data revealed that the distribution of inflation-adjusted damages
variables was not normally distributed. Since using data that are not normally
distributed would violate the assumptions underlying the logistic regression,
for the purpose of the regressions, we normalized the current award data
using a Box Cox transformation.45 For the sake of transparency, we provide
regression results using the current award data and the Box Cox transfor-
mation data.
Table 6 displays the logit results using the Box Cox transformed
damages amount (Panel A), and a nontransformed damages amount (Panel
B). Each model contains a variable indicating the presence of a remittitur and
the presence of comparability review. These two variables are dichotomous
variables coded 1 if the case contains a specified element and 0 if the case does
not contain that element. All regressions also control for the seven primary
causes of action: negligence, trespass, assault, slander, libel, wrongful ejection,
and personal injury. A time-trend variable indicating the year that the case was
decided is included to capture changes in the probability of reversal over time.
The cause-of-action variables and the time-trend variable assure that our
results are not capturing differences among causes of action or differences
across time. Finally, each model also contains a constant term.
46
4'A Box Cox normality plot can often be used to find a transformation that will approximately
normalize the data. y(l) = ((y L) - 1)/I for I not equal to zero y(l) = log(y)L = 0. See GE.P. Box
& D.R. Cox, An Analysis of Transformations, 26. J. of Royal Statistical Soc'y, Series B 211-46
(1964). The transformation that is used is: (Award in current dollars 0.7483d5_ 1)/0.1748383.
Table 4 presents, and plots of the untransformed data confirm, that cases that are reversed and
affirmed have nearly the same median, but vastly different means. The mean and median for
cases that were reversed was $68,000 and $20,000, respectively; for cases that were affirmed it was
$50,000 and $21,000, respectively. The skewness disappears with the transformation.
461n logistic regression, the constant term measures the probability of reversal when the inde-
pendent variables equal zero. In our case, the constant term measures the probability of reversal
when damages are zero and when there is neither comparability review nor a remittitur present.
The constant term is included for convention; it will not be interpreted in this model because
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Model 1 used the full data set (N= 1,175) to examine the probability of
reversal as a function of the level of total damages, controlling for the
presence of comparability review, remittitur, seven causes of action, and
time. To isolate the different effects that the presence of economic and
noneconomic damages can have on the probability of reversal, Models 2-4
examined subsets of the total damages cases. Each model examined the
probability of reversal as a function of the total level of damages, controlling
for the presence of comparability review, remittitur, seven causes of action,
and time, with Model 2 limited to the economic damages cases (N= 344),
Model 3 limited to the noneconomic damages cases (N= 454), and Model 4
limited to the cases where one cannot tell if noneconomic damages are
present (N= 377). To confirm that cases that contained noneconomic
damages are different from cases that did not contain noneconomic
damages, such that we can properly specify separate logit models, we ran
a Hausman specification test on Models 2 and 3.47 The Hausman result
confirms that the models are properly specified.
We use Table 6 to examine and compare the coefficient estimates for
the independent variables in each of the regressions. In technical terms, the
coefficient estimate is the corresponding variable's effect on the logarithm of
the odds of the dependent variable, adjusting for all other variables included
in the model. Simply, regression coefficients measure the predictive capabil-
ity of the independent variables. Positive coefficients increase the chances
that a reversal will be observed, and negative coefficients increase the
chances that a reversal will not be observed. The strength of the statistical
relationship is noted by an *, with *** representing the strongest statistical
relationship and the absence of an * representing a weak, not statistically
significant, relationship.
We focus on the transformed variable results in Panel A, noting differ-
ences with Panel B results when appropriate. Model 1 examines the rate of
reversal for the full set of cases. In Model 1, the coefficient for the damages
award is 0.181 and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This means
that a one-unit increase in the damages variable is associated with a 0.181
change in the log odds of the dependent variable (the natural log of the
probability that the dependent = 1 divided by the probability that the depen-
dent = 0). Holding other factors constant, for all cases, an increase in total
damages will increase the probability of reversal. Models 2-4 are provided to
47J. Hausman, Specification Tests in Econometrics, 46 Econometrica 1251-71 (1978).
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examine the probability of reversal when the data set is divided into three
subsets of cases. Here we note the principal (statistically significant) findings.
In cases where noneconomic damages are present (Model 3), damages
increase the probability of a reversal. This is more pronounced in the Panel
A results than in the Panel B results. Specifically, in Model 3, the coefficient
for the variable total damages is 0.867 and statistically significant at the 1
percent level, meaning that a one-unit increase in the independent variable
is associated with a 0.867 change in the log odds of the dependent variable.
The effect of total damages in predicting rate of reversal is virtually nonex-
istent in cases containing economic damages (Model 2), and in cases where
we cannot tell if noneconomic damages are present (Model 4).
In cases where one cannot distinguish whether one or both types of
damages are present (Model 4), the coefficient for total damages is not
statistically significant and therefore it cannot be interpreted. This was
expected. Although these cases contain the word "damages" in the opinion
and cite the award 'amount, they do not generally discuss or identify the
nature of the injury or relief sought. At the same time, we also thought that,
if we could roughly sort the cases according to the likelihood of their
containing noneconomic damages, we would find that the probability of
reversal increases as damages increase in the cases that likely contain non-
economic compensatory damages.
We noted in our data a close association between punitive damages and
noneconomic damages and, indeed, for intuitively obvious reasons (both are
providing compensation for intangible losses). The economic damages cat-
egory has 344 cases, 21 percent of which contain punitive damages. There
are 454 cases in the noneconomic category, of which 44 percent have puni-
tive damages. Meanwhile, the "can't tell" category has 377 cases, of which 35
percent contain punitive damages. If the presence of punitive damages is
indicative of the presence of noneconomic damages, we predicted that the
coefficient for the "can't tell" category would be positive if we controlled for
punitive damages in some way. To check for this, we ran additional logit
models separating cases with punitive damages from cases without punitive
damages.48 In cases where one cannot tell whether noneconomic damages
are present and punitive damages are present, the coefficient is not
4 For ease of reference, we include in the Appendix a table (Al) with the results from the
additional logit models cited in the discussion of punitive damages. Table Al results are
generated using the same 1,175 cases used to generate Table 6 results.
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significant so we are unable to interpret this result in any meaningful way.49
However, while earlier results in Table 6 suggested that the presence of
economic damages does not influence the probability of reversal, we find
that when we consider cases with both economic and punitive damages, the
case has a higher probability of reversal. For cases that contained economic
damages and punitive damages, the coefficient for total damages is positive
and significant at the 10 percent level."
Our explanation of the role of punitive damages suggests one final
question that must be addressed. Perhaps what we are observing with the
Model 3 results is driven by the court's treatment of punitive damages rather
than its treatment of noneconomic compensatory damages. To test this, we
ran additional logit models using the same dependent and independent
variables as used in the earlier specifications and subsets of the full data set.
First, we divided the group of cases containing noneconomic damages into
two subsets-those with and without punitive damages-and ran two logit
models. In both, the coefficient for the variable total damages was positive
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, as found earlier in Model 3.
The relationship between increasing damages and rates of reversal was
similar in the two sets, although the relationship was stronger in cases
involving punitive damages." The existence of punitive damages raises the
magnitude and significance of the coefficient. A case that contains both
noneconomic damages and punitive damages is more likely to be reversed
than if it only contained noneconomic damages. For robustness, we ran a
second set of regressions. We divided the total number of cases into those
cases with and without punitive damages and specified two additional logit
models. In both regressions, we found that the coefficient for total damages
was positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level only when
4 Within the subset of cases for which one cannot tell if noneconomic damages are present: the
logit coefficient for cases with no punitive damages was -0.240 (with a z statistic of 1.22); for
cases with punitive damages the coefficient was -0.149 (0.65). Both results are statistically
insignificant.
5°Within the subset of cases that contain economic damages, the logit coefficient for cases with
no punitive damages was -0.030 (with a z statistic of 0.23); for cases with punitive damages the
coefficient was -0.600 (1.66) and was significant at the 10 percent level.
5'For cases with noneconomic damages and no punitive damages, the coefficient was 0.066
(4.07); for cases with noneconomic damages and punitive damages, the coefficient was 0.120
(5.17). Note that both results are significant at the 1 percent level, yet for the punitive damages
result both the coefficient and the z statistic are higher, implying a stronger statistical effect.
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noneconomic damages were present. The fact that these effects disappear in
the absence of noneconomic damages suggests that punitive damages alone
do not increase the probability of reversal; however, they play a role in
increasing the probability of reversal when noneconomic damages are
present.
Two observations can be made regarding the use of comparability
review and remittitur. The practice of comparability review decreases the
probability of reversal in cases that contain noneconomic damages. This
result is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Similarly, the practice of
using a remittitur decreases the probability of reversal in cases that contain
economic damages. This result is statistically significant at the 5 percent
level.
The time trend has a negative and significant coefficient in Models 1,
2, and 4, implying that, in general, as cases approach the turn of the century,
they are more likely to be affirmed than reversed. This can be said for all the
cases, for cases that do not contain noneconomic damages, and for cases
where one cannot tell if noneconomic damages were present. This is not true
for cases that contain noneconomic damages.
The time trend is not significant in the regression containing cases with
noneconomic damages.
Do cases with a particular cause of action have a higher probability of
reversal? All regressions contained controls for the leading causes of action:
negligence, trespass, assault, slander, libel, wrongful ejection, and personal
injury. In only one regression was the coefficient for the cause of action
significant. For the subset of cases where one cannot tell if noneconomic
damages are present, if the case is a trespass action, it is more likely to be
reversed.
Finally, the results from Table 6 can be used to plot the relationship
between level of damages and the probability of reversal. Specifically, we can
use the coefficients from the logit results in Panel A and plug those into the
logit equation specified earlier to calculate the predicted probability of
reversal for each case, for the full set 1,175, and for subsets of the full data
set. The calculation is performed for Model 3, the set of cases focusing on
noneconomic damages, and the result is the implied probability function of
reversal as damage verdict increases, plotted in Figure 5.
In Figure 5, the horizontal axis represents the monetary damage award
in current dollars and the vertical axis represents the probability of reversal,
from 0 to 1. The circles and squares represent the 454 cases in our data set
that contain noneconomic damages. This graph uses the data from the
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Figure5: Implied probability of reversal for cases with noneconomic
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logistic regression in Panel A, Model 3, to calculate an expectation of reversal
for one case based on previous cases. The result is a probability between 0
and 1. The graph demonstrates two results quite dramatically. First, as the
award increases, so does the probability of reversal. Second, the probability
of reversal is reduced by the presence of comparability review (the negative
and statistically significant coefficient for comparability review in Model 3).
The observations implicitly form two curves that illustrate this effect.
The circles that form the top curve are cases where noneconomic
damages are present and there is no comparability review. The top curve
implies that the higher the damage award, the more likely the case is to be
reversed. Verdicts approaching $1 million have a very high chance of rever-
sal, whereas monetary damage verdicts lower than $50,000 have a less than
50 percent chance of reversal.52
52We want to emphasize that the curves reflect the accumulating probability of reversal. We
actually have one case involving high damages that was not reversed that we include in the set
of noneconomic compensatories. As we discuss below, it probably did not involve noneconomic
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The squares forming the bottom curve are cases where noneconomic
damages are present and comparability review has been used. The bottom
curve shows the probability of reversal for the level of noneconomic damages
when comparability review is present, suggesting that the court's practice of
comparability review decreases the probability of reversal.
E. Compression of Awards
There is evidence that courts in the 19th century compressed damage awards
toward the mean damage award. We can present this phenomenon visually
using histograms representing the distribution of affirmed and reversed
damage awards. Since an initial plot of the data revealed that the distribution
of the inflation-adjusted damages variable was not normally distributed, we
used a Box Cox transformation to normalize the current award data.
Figure 6 uses the transformed data to illustrate two histograms-the top
displays the distribution of affirmed awards and the bottom displays the
distribution of reversed awards. For both affirmed and reversed cases, the
gray bars represent cases with noneconomic damages and the clear bars
represent the distribution of all other cases not containing noneconomic
damages. Three points can be noted.
First, cases that contain noneconomic damages and are reversed have
higher means-suggesting that higher damages and, in particular, those
with higher noneconomic damages, are more likely to be reversed. This is a
visual confirmation of the result found in Section II.D using multivariate
logistic regression-namely, that cases with noneconomic damages are more
likely to be reversed.
Second, the range of data in the affirmed cases in Figure 6 appears to
suggest that affirmed cases are more compressed around the mean com-
pared to reversed cases. The inference from such a statement is that when an
appellate court hears a case with an extreme (high or low) lower court
damage verdict, the court is more likely to reverse the case. We can perform
a simple standard deviation using the original data on real damages without
the trend test to confirm such a statement in a univariate setting. Similar to
the simple t test for mean difference, a variance ratio test can be used to test
compensatories, but we nonetheless treat it as such to be conservative. In any event, our Figure 5
should not be construed as suggesting that this one case does not exist; it is demonstrating that
a priori the probability of such a case not being reversed is quite low, even though this one was
not reversed.
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Figure 6: Histograms of damage awards by affirmed and reversed cases and
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for differences in standard deviation of two groups. The standard deviation
of affirmed cases is 0.0838; for reversed cases it is 0.1226. The Ftest finds that
these deviations are different at the 1 percent level of confidence.
Naturally, the high skew in the nontransformed data may drive these
,results. However, the standard deviations between affirmed awards and
reversed awards remain statistically different both using a robust Levine
variance difference test (to handle nonnormality) at the 1 percent level and
using a variance ratio test of the Box Cox transformed data (as shown in
Figure 6) at the 5 percent level. We conclude from these results that the
damage awards for affirmed cases are more compressed than those for
reversed cases.
Third, when we examine the standard deviation of the noneconomic
cases by themselves in the affirmed and reversed cases, we find suggestive but
nonconclusive evidence of compression. Both the variance ratio test and the
Levine robust variance test on nontransformed data find that reversed cases
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have higher standard deviations. However, using the transformed data, the
Box Cox variance ratio test cannot reject that the standard deviations are
statistically equivalent.
Collectively, Figure 6 and the statistical tests indicate that the courts
in the 19th century compressed awards to the mean. Although awards for
affirmed cases are more compressed than awards for reversed cases, evi-
dence of compression for the smaller subset of cases containing noneco-
nomic damages is suggestive but inconclusive. The idea of compression.
as a whole is an unexplored and fascinating topic warranting further
investigation.
III. CONCLUSION: EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS
The most telling implications of our empirical study support our original
hypothesis that the courts through 1900 indeed kept a tight control overjury
damage awards, notwithstanding the proposition of significant jury discre-
tion. Perhaps the most remarkable finding is that there were only two
affirmed cases prior to the 20th century in which total damages exceed
$450,000 in current dollars. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that either con-
tained much in the way of noneconomic compensatory damages. In Lake
Shore & M. S. K Co. v. Rosenzweig,"3 the plaintiff was wrongfully ejected from
a train some distance from the terminal in a highly dangerous situation. He
was struck from behind and knocked unconscious. No other harm is men-
tioned in the case. In affirming the judgment, the appellate court did not
mention noneconomic damages such as pain and suffering, but dwelt at
length on the propriety of punitive damages. The case is thus about punitive
damages rather than noneconomic compensatory damages (although we
categorize it as a "can't tell" case). In the other case affirming a large verdict,
Campbell v. Arbuckle,54 the jury found a breach of a contract to marry.
Although a contract case, we include it because noneconomic compensatory
damages were allowed in such cases for humiliation and so forth. In affirm-
ing the damages, the appellate court said that "it is manifest that [thejurors]
have confined their verdict to actual damages only, and those, too, based
upon a rather economical application of the rule of damages in this class of
53See 113 Pa. 519 (1986).
54See 4 N.Y.S. 29 (1889).
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cases. The verdict was only four and one-half per cent., for one year, on the
estate of the defendant, as he admitted it to be.
55
There is thus no tort case prior to 1900 that permitted a noneconomic
compensatory damages award that exceeded $450,000 in current dollars. In
fact, as our discussion of Rosenzweig and Campbell points out, it is obvious
that no case permitted an award of noneconomic compensatory damages
anywhere near $450,000. Our figures are total damages in the cases, only one
component of which is noneconomic compensatory damages, and thus they
include economic compensatory damages as well. We were forced to employ
total damages because the courts in the 19th century did not separate the
different types of compensatory damages in their opinions. Thus, our
work can best be seen as demonstrating rather low absolute limits on such
damages.
There are other striking findings here. As the amount of noneconomic
damages increases, so does the probability of reversal. Often, the basis of
reversal is explicitly excessiveness, sometimes it is something else; in either
case, it is obvious that the amount of damages influences outcomes regard-
less of the explicitjustifications given by the courts. As was true of the courts'
refusal to give up control over juries generally, the courts during this period
maintained substantial control over damage awards, keeping them remark-
ably in line.
551d. at 30.
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APPENDIX A
Table Al: Logit Regression Results for Cases With and Without Punitive
Damages: Dependent Variable is Whether or Not the Reversal Occurred
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Economic Noneconomic Cases Where
Damages Damages One Cannot
All Cases Cases Only Cases Only Tell
2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b
No No No
]a Punitive Punitive Punitive Punitive Punitive Punitive
Logit Results Using Awards Transformed with Box Cox Transformation
Damages 0.181*** -0.030 0.600* 0.740*** 1.325*** -0.240 -0.149
award (2.59) (0.23) (1.66) (3.78) (4.79) (1.22) (0.65)
Comparability -0.261 -0.259 0.991 -1.036** -0.498 0.190 0.019
review (1.11) (0.55) (0.67) (2.14) (0.72) (0.30) (0.02)
Presence of -0.255 -0.856* -0.931 -0.054 0.547 -0.197 0.713
remittitur (1.25) (1.69) (0.94) (0.13) (0.80) (0.43) (0.96)
Negligence -0.077 0.004 -0.074 -0.465 0.795 0.027 0.336
(0.41) (0.01) (0.09) (1.28) (1.48) (0.05) (0.53)
Trespass 0.243 -0.082 0.046 -0.301 0.355 0.850 1.122
(1.21) (0.22) (0.06) (0.51) (0.47) (1.48) (1.56)
Assault -0.205 0.819 - -0.365 -0.062 -0.216 0.528
(0.82) (0.90) - (0.66) (0.11) (0.33) (0.76)
Slander -0.005 0.544 - -1.781** 0.501 0.243 0.758
(0.02) (0.69) - (2.07) (0.84) (0.42) (0.99)
Libel -0.153 - 1.186 0.018 0.376 -0.680 -0.705
(0.56) - (0.70) (0.03) (0.60) (0.91) (0.83)
Wrongful -0.297 - 0.804 0.224 -0.363 -0.435 -0.812
ejection (0.84) - (0.53) (0.34) (0.51) (0.35) (0.65)
Personal 0.132 -0.356 0.612 0.029 - 0.117 -
injury (0.40) (0.37) (0.37) (0.06) - (0.14) -
Time trend -0.013*** -0.019** -0.052** -0.015 0.004 -0.010 -0.024
(3.35) (2.52) (2.19) (1.29) (0.29) (1.29) (1.54)
Constant 1.514*** 1.542* 6.258** 3.210*** 3.119** -0.550 0.988
(3.49) (1.84) (2.42) (2.66) (2.30) (0.52) (0.61)
Observations 1,175 273 71 255 199 245 132
Total Obs. 1,175 344 454 377
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
NOTE: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. Box Cox transformation: (Award in Current
Dollars 0,174s53 - 1)/0.1748383. Cells with no contents indicate no observations for that cause of
action.

